INTRODUCTION
A formal treaty ratified in conformance with constitutionally prescribed procedures is the most concrete, and should be the least controversial, form of international legal cooperation. In recent years, however, the growth of social and economic interdependence on a global scale has led to a substantial increase in international cooperation on shared legal concerns. The result has been an expansion of treaty law into an ever broader field of CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1263 In a recent essay in this Review, Professor Y oo addresses a new issue, the formal and functional considerations that govern treaty interpretation. 15 In light of the expanding scope of treaties in our legal system, this issue carries the potential to become both practically more significant and substantively more controversial than in the past. Surprisingly, however, the matter of treaty interpretation has thus far received only limited scholarly attention. 16 This fact is all the more curious, as Professor Y oo notes, 17 given that the parallel subject of statutory interpretation is now one of the most animated themes of American legal thought.
18
Professor Y oo bases his analysis of treaty interpretation on a reevaluation 19 of a heated, historical debate during the Reagan administration over the power of the President to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ("ABM") between the United States and what was then the U.S.S.R. 20 Briefly, Professor Yoo's position is that formal and functional constitutional considerations lead to the conclusion that the President has "unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret treaties." 21 In the course of his argument, Professor Y oo also challenges the notion that the federal courts could have a substantial role to play in the development of treaty 15 REv. 405, 426-28 ( 1989) . Perhaps the most spirited debate over statutory interpretation concerns the proper role of legislative history in interpretive inquiries. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 30-35 (1997) (criticizing the use of legislative history); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 61, 68-70 (1994) (same) ; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (comprehensively reviewing the emergence of textualist approaches to statutory interpretation).
19. As Professor Y oo describes in some detail, a suggestion by the Reagan administration that it had the right to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty sparked a contentious debate in both political circles and legal scholarship. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 851-68 (describing the controversy at the time). For an introduction to the scholarly debate on this subject, see Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky [B] oth formalist and functionalist approaches to the separation of powers lead to the conclusion that the President ought to have the unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret treaties."); see also id. at 865 ("Whether we apply textualist or dynamic notions of interpretation to treaties, it is clear that the President must enjoy the power to interpret international agreements on behalf of the nation.").
law. 22 I advanced an argument in support of that notion in an earlier work entitled Dynamic Treaty Interpretation.2 3 Specifically, I argued there that certain private-law treaties delegate to federal courts the authority to develop the law within the treaties' scope. 24
In his essay, Professor Yoo questions the constitutional foundation for such an argument. The notion of a delegation of common-law powers through treaties, he asserts, "suffers from [a] failure to identify any constitutional authorization for such an enormous transfer of power from the treatymakers to the courts .... " 25 Indeed, he suggests that such a delegation "would arguably violate the Constitution if undertaken domestically."26 Professor Yoo raises an excellent question, indeed one for which there is virtually no other scholarly commentary and only limited judicial authority. Here, I take up a general response to his challenge.
My argument proceeds in three principal parts. Part I responds to the formal assertion that all treaties are fundamentally executive in nature, as well as its consequence that treaty interpretation is a matter within the unilateral control of the President. Specifically, I argue that if limited to those treaties that solely create sovereign obligations on the international plane, 27 there may be some merit in this point. 28 But for those treaties that create rights or obligations directly enforceable as domestic law, I contend that the closest formal and functional analog is Article I legislation. For such treaties, the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power in Article III together allocate the final authority over their application and interpretation to the courts. 29 Part II of this Essay then turns to the constitutionality of delegation to the federal courts of an enhanced interpretive power to develop the law within the scope of a treaty. Substantial, compelling authority now supports the proposition that separation of powers and federalism concerns do not prohibit Congress's deliberate and circumscribed delegation of a similar power through Article I legislation. 30 [Vol. 90:1263 which are properly viewed as "equivalent to an act of the legislature," 31 reflect a compelling parallel with the constitutional foundation for delegation in the statutory context. As a result, there is no constitutional infirmity in a deliberate and circumscribed delegation to the federal courts of a power to develop the law within the scope of such treaties. 32 Indeed, a clear example of such a delegation under a treaty already exists. As we shall see in Part II.B, the private-law conventions analyzed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation expressly authorize the courts to fill the gaps in their regulatory scheme as they emerge through judicial examination over time. 33 Finally, Part III addresses Professor Y oo' s claim that functional considerations mandate absolute deference to the President in the interpretation of treaties. I will argue that, while the executive branch may have structural advantages over the judicial branch in interpreting those treaties that address national defense, diplomacy, and similar matters at the core of our nation's foreign policy, all treaties do not raise such concerns equally. Arguments founded on executive preeminence in foreign affairs, while important in some contexts, dissolve in others. 34 Likewise, for some treaties, such as the private commercial law conventions discussed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 35 there is little reason to assume any special executive-branch expertise as compared to the traditional means of interpretation through domestic judicial proceedings. 36 In short, while some form of calibrated deference may be appropriate, foreign affairs and executive expertise rhetoric does not justifY absolute judicial abdication in favor of fleeting executive views on the interpretation of all treaties.
I THE JUDICIAL POWER AND TREATY INTERPRETATION
Professor Yoo's point of departure on the subject of treaty interpretation is a series of formal arguments about the nature of treaties in our constitutional system. His core contention is that the placement of the Treaty Clause in Article II of the Constitution "indicates that the power to make treaties, and by extension to interpret them, remains an executive one.'m He bolsters this argument by citing to the Vesting Clause in Article I, Section 1. 38 Because that clause limits the legislative powers allocated to 31. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829 Congress to those "herein granted," he reasons that any powers found in Article II (such as the treaty power) cannot be legislative in nature. 39 To be sure, the Constitution mandates the participation of a legislative institution (the Senate) in the treaty-making process. 40 In his view, however, this participation merely reveals that the Senate plays a role in the exercise of executive functions, and not that treaty making is a legislative powerY
The principal target ofProfessor Yoo's observations appears to be the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in matters of treaty interpretation. 42 But his argument that the treaty power's location in Article II implies that the President has ''unilateral authority" 43 to interpret (and reinterpret) treaties has significant implications for the role of the judiciary as well. If his formal argument is correct, then there are derivative limitations on the traditional judicial responsibility in that context "to say what the law is."
44
Before examining the propriety of a delegation of common-law powers through the vehicle of a treaty, therefore, we must first determine the fundamental nature of treaties, and thus the allocation of authority over their interpretation, in our constitutional structure.
A. The Nature ofTreaties
The first step in our analysis is a familiar, but nonetheless essential, one. As Professor Y oo has analyzed in some detail, prior to the Framing, treaties were traditionally understood to be mere contracts between sovereign nations. 45 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1263 No. 75, who noted that "the essence ofthe legislative authority is to enact laws, or in other words to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society," whereas the objects of treaties, "are CONTRACTS with foreign nations .... " 46 Because their essential nature involved sovereign actors defining their own obligations to entities external to their own legal systems, therefore, treaties reflected something fundamentally other than domestic law. 47 In other words, this international (that is, external) contract paradigm held that treaties derive their force as law not from domestic sources, but rather from an elastic duty of "good faith" owed merely to foreign sovereigns.
48
The Supremacy Clause and Article III, however, marked a departure from this traditional model. Without express limitation, Article VI provides that the Constitution, laws, and "all Treaties" shall be "the supreme Law of the Land."
49 To carry this equivalent status into effect, Article III establishes that the judicial power extends not only to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, but also to "treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." 50 The inclusion within the judicial power in Article III thus placed treaties on an equal footing with Article I laws.
Beginning with some of its earliest examinations of the subject, the Supreme Court recognized that in the United States, treaties may function as more than mere contracts between sovereigns. The Court's opinion in Foster v. Neilson remains perhaps the clearest statement of this recognition:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished . . . . In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. 
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As this foundational pronouncement of the Supreme Court makes clear, the significant diversity in treaty substance precludes any reliable generalizations about the fundamental nature of all treaties.
52 Some treaties may indeed solely "import a contract."
53 That is, they may involve merely a promise by the United States as a sovereign entity to a foreign sovereign. In such a case, the treaty may indeed "address[] itself to the political, not the judicial department." 54 This "sovereign contract" paradigm collapses, however, when generalized beyond that specific class of treaties. Some treaties create rights that are enforceable directly by individuals in domestic courts. From a formal perspective, the Supremacy Clause gives such treaties the force of law, indeed the supreme law of the land. Moreover, Article III makes clear that the judicial power, which of its essence is the interpretive authority "to say what the law is," 55 extends to treaties as well. As part of the law of the land, these domestically enforceable treaties must also fall within the executive's obligation in Article II, Section 3 to "take care" that the "Laws" are faithfully executed. 5 6 As a result, until terminated, 57 their provisions should bind the President just as does any other form of extant federal law.
58 As Professor 52. If one follows the alternate suggestion advanced by Professor Y oo that (beyond a mere "soft" rule presumption against self-execution) the structural Constitution entirely prohibits self-executing treaties, at least on matters within Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority, the possibility for treaties of a legislative nature radically diminishes. See Y oo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2092 (suggesting the possibility of such an approach); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, at 2220 (describing this approach as a "hard" rule by which "[t]reaties cannot receive judicial enforcement in areas that fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, without statutory implementation by Congress"). Stripped of this possibility, the debate over self-execution in our constitutional system focuses upon the question of what standards courts should apply to distinguish between those treaties that create immediately enforceable domestic law rights and those that do not. While important, this question ultimately does not control the separate issue analyzed here of whether, for those treaties that do create such rights in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed standards, a treaty may delegate to the judiciary enhanced interpretive authority for matters within their scope.
53 REv. 649, 655 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley, Chevron Deforence] (stating that self-executing treaties "presumably are also part of the 'Laws' referred to in Article IT's Take Care Clause").
57. Professor Y oo has argued that the President should have a unilateral authority to terminate treaties. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 873-74 ("Although the constitutional text is silent on the issue, most commentators, courts, and government entities believe that the President may terminate a treaty unilaterally.") (citing, inter alia, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979 ), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979 ), vacated as moot, 444 U.S. 996 (1979 Neilson, the Supreme Court has only once denied relief because a treaty was not self-executing, and even that decision was ambiguous). See also id. (citing a number of cases in which the Supreme Court expressly found that a treaty was self-executing); id. (citing numerous additional cases in which the Court interpreted a treaty without even questioning that it was enforceable by the courts). Separately, the Supreme Court has expressly found that, notwithstanding the political question doctrine, courts have the authority to interpret treaties. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) .
61. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, 699 ("The recognition that treaties, along with the Constitution and federal statutes, are 'law' and therefore enforceable by the courts without prior legislative transformation into domestic law does not, of course, mean that treaties may be enforced in court by any individual at any time.").
62. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (noting the distinction); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (observing that the Constitution places self-executing treaties in the same category as other laws of Congress that create rights "capable of enforcement as between private parties"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that a treaty is to be regarded as "equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision").
63. A phenomenon that parallels the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties exists with certain statutory delegations to administrative agencies of the discretion to adopt implementing regulations. Although the statutory authorization qualifies as law, no enforceable individual rights or obligations exist until the agency decides to exercise its authority to issue the regulations. See also Y oo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, at 2244-48 (discussing the various aspects of statutory law that are not immediately enforceable by federal courts).
provisions are not (or not yet) amenable to judicial enforcement in domestic courts. Some non-self-executing treaties, for example, may be merely precatory or otherwise too vague for judicial enforcement. 64 Some may address political issues over which courts properly hesitate to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of particularly clear guidance. 65 Others may delegate to Congress the decision as to whether, and if so to what extent, they should be given force as domestic law through Article I legislation.
66 Still others may not be enforceable because of a more conspicuous absence, both in their own provisions and by reference to other sources oflaw, of a private right of action for individuals. 67 In all these cases, even though the Senate has properly given its consent, the substance of the treaties reveals that the discretion concerning the timing and means of their enforcement has first been entrusted to constitutional institutions other than the federal judiciary.
68
The particular constitutional constraints on the recognition of treaties as enforceable domestic law have been the subject of exhaustive historical 64. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) (examining the distinction b~tween mandatory obligations and mere precatory provisions under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status ofRefugees); Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-25 (1952) (holding that the provisions of the United Nations Charter were too vague to be self-executing). In this sense, there is a parallel between the notion that the provisions of a treaty may be too vague for enforcement and one aspect of the political question doctrine that asks whether there are "judicially discoverable and manageable standards. " See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) REv. 233, 233-34 (1979) (arguing that declarations attached upon Senate consent that a treaty is not self-executing "are of dubious validity, probably have no binding effect on United States courts, and should not be used as aids in construing the treaties").
and structural analysis by Professor Y oo and his critics. 69 We need not wade into the thicket of this thorny debate over whether the Constitution requires a presumption for or against self-execution, however, to extract the broader principle.
7°
For our purposes here it is sufficient to observe, in accordance with established Supreme Court precedent, 71 that some, though not all, treaties create rights or obligations that are directly enforceable as domestic law in federal courts.
B. Treaty Interpretation
Contrary to the sovereign contract paradigm, therefore, self-executing treaties are properly viewed as the formal and functional equivalent of Article I legislation.
72 Like statutory law, these treaties by definition involve the government's creation of individual rights (or obligations), and are enforceable in court at the behest of or against individuals. To return to the quote from Alexander Hamilton, such treaties reflect "the essence of the legislative authority," for they directly "prescribe rules for the regulation of the society."
73
In accordance with this reasoning, the Supreme Court itself has long recognized that the role of the courts in the application of a self-executing treaty is functionally identical to that for Article I legislation. Indeed, in its foundational pronouncement in Foster v. Neilson, the Court described such a treaty as "equivalent to an act of the legislature."
74 Likewise, in the later case of Whitney v. Robertson, the Court emphasized that where treaty provisions "are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them 69. See generally Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14 (challenging the traditional acceptance of self-executing treaties on the basis of an analysis of the historical background and structure of the Constitution). But see Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2105-51 (disagreeing with Professor Yoo's historical account); Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2158-68 (same).
70. See Y oo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2092 (concluding that there should at least be a "presumption" against self-execution); Y oo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, at 2220 (describing a "soft" rule, under which "courts can remain true to the text, structure, and original understanding of the Constitution by requiring the treaty-makers to issue a clear statement if they want a treaty to be self-executing"). But see Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2157-58 (concluding, even after reviewing the Supreme Court authority cited by Professor Yoo, that the Supremacy Clause "adopt[s] a default rule that treaties have the force of domestic law, a rule that may be reversed by the treatymakers through a clear statement in the treaty itself (or reservation thereto)").
71. See supra note 62 (citing such authority). 72. See also Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2210-11 (arguing in response to Professor Yoo's structural constitutional arguments that "if we equate 'legislation' and 'law' ... then the combination of Articles II and VI would produce a clear allocation of legislative power to the President (and Senate)"). operative ... they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment."
75
The Court was even more explicit in the The Head Money Cases. 16 There, in the process of drawing a contrast to mere sovereign contracts, it concluded that treaty provisions that create individual rights "partake of the nature of municipal law ... [and] the Constitution of the United States places such provisions as these in the same category as other laws of Congress.'m When, then, the rights created by a treaty "are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute."
78
To be sure, treaties come into being through an Article II process formally initiated by the President 79 that differs from that for Article I legislation. But, significantly, where the President initiates the Article II process for the creation of law, the Constitution also requires the involvement of the legislature, namely a supermajority ofthe Senate, before a treaty can obtain the force of domestic law. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause expressly provides that, for those treaties whose substance so directs, the constitutional product of the Article II process is the same as Article I lawmaking.
80 When a treaty addresses itself to the courts, therefore, Article III requires that they apply it just as they would a statute or any other form of judicially enforceable law. Professor Yoo's response to this well-established constitutional law is to assert simply that the treaty power is found in Article II. In his view, because Article II vests executive power in the President, 81 the mere 75. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) . Professor Louis Henkin has also equated self-executing treaties with legislation. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. ll51, ll69 (1956) (arguing that "Article VI establishes that the treaty power includes an important power to legislate domestically"). See also Golove, supra note 13, at 1286.
Golove observed that

!d.
[t]he treaty power empowers the President and Senate, incident to making agreements with foreign states, to promulgate laws. As a result, whenever a treaty makes stipulations on subjects falling within the scope of Congress's legislative authorities, the treaty overrides the general separation of powers principle that legislative authority is vested in Congress. 79. There has been some debate over whether the intent behind "advice" language in the Treaty Clause requires the Senate's active participation from the very beginning of the treaty-making process. But, as Professor Yoo correctly observes, actual practice after the adoption of the Constitution quickly excluded formal Senate involvement until after negotiations were completed. placement in that article of the power to make treaties must mean that the sole constitutional authority over the interpretation (and reinterpretation) of all treaties also resides with the President. 82 This hyperstructuralist view is unconvincing for a number of reasons.
First, the text and structure of the Constitution beyond Article II is inconsistent with Professor Yoo's attempt to reason "by extension"
83 that the power of the President to make treaties (with, significantly, the consent of the Senate) includes the judicial power to interpret and apply them. In a near exact textual parallel with Article II's Vesting Clause, Article III, Section 1 provides that " [t] he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 84 As we have seen, this judicial power expressly extends to treaties as well. 85 Second, the Supreme Court long ago established that the initial power to create law does not include a subsequent power to interpret it. The Constitution expressly vests in Congress the power to create federal law through Article I legislation (even over the veto of the President). The Supreme Court has nonetheless emphatically declared that this power to create federal law does not by extension grant to a later Congress the authority over its interpretation. Specifically, the Court has concluded that the interpretive opinions of a later Congress form a "hazardous basis" for discerning the meaning of an earlier statute, 86 and indeed are of "very little, if any, significance." 87 Even as the preeminent institution in creating Article I legislation, a subsequent Congress does not have the power to interpret an earlier statute without adhering to the full constitutional process for the creation of binding legal norms (that is, without passing a law signed by, or over the veto of, the President).
82. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 864 (criticizing the Reagan administration with regard to the first ABM reinterpretation controversy because it "fail[ed] to make the stronger argument that the President has the sole constitutional power to reinterpret treaties on behalf of the nation ... "); id. at 878 (asserting that the President has "unilateral authority to reinterpret treaties").
83. !d. at 870 (arguing that "the Treaty Clause's placement in Article II, Section 2 indicates that the power to make treaties, and by extension to interpret them, remains an executive one"). The observation that the treaty power is found in Article II and not in Article I in this respect is a distinction without a difference. Like Article I legislation, the result of the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches in the creation of self-executing treaties under Article II is domestically enforceable federal law. Once this occurs, that the President had the initial power to make such a treaty does not mean that he retains the judicial power to interpret and apply it, any more than the Senate's participation in the process grants it such a power.
88 While foreign policy concerns may justify some form of calibrated deference to the interpretive views of the executive, 89 Article III ultimately vests the judicial power over treaties in the federal courts.
In broad purpose, Article III reflects the insight that control by one of the political branches over the power both to create and to apply the law threatens the structural protections of the Constitution.
90 Indeed, as the Supreme Court observed in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., one of the core purposes of Article III was to abolish the practice, common at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, of state political bodies acting as the fmal judicial authority on individual cases. 91 In the case of those treaties that operate as domestically enforceable law, the separation of powers doctrine thus operates to ensure that one political branch (here, the executive) cannot combine its authority to create legal rights and obligations with an unchecked power to interpret and apply them to specific citizens and disputes. 92 Moreover, the view that the executive has exclusive authority to interpret treaties renders irrelevant the Senate's mandatory participation in the creation of Article II treaty law. If, subsequent to the Senate's advice 92. When applied to self-executing treaties, Professor Yoo's argument that the President has the exclusive power of interpretation also collapses under its own weight. If the President has such exclusive authority, then presumably federal courts would not have the authority to even entertain causes of action and resolve disputes under such treaties. Alternatively, courts would have to stay all actions founded on treaty rights until the executive branch has instructed the courts regarding the meaning of the relevant provisions. and consent to a self-executing treaty, the President has a unilateral, unreviewable power to interpret (and reinterpret) it, the careful cooperation between the executive and legislative branches prescribed by the Constitution becomes meaningless. Presumably, then, any President would have the unilateral authority to disregard the text of a treaty and even express Senate reservations to a treaty's substance and effect. 93 In short, contrary to the Constitution's careful safeguards against arbitrary governmental actions, the very content of the law would be subject to the fleeting whims of executive-branch officials.
Ultimately Professor Yoo's position on the interpretive power of the President clashes with the established principle that treaties, if their substance so directs, may create individual rights that are directly enforceable as federal law in federal courts. For such treaties, an assertion that the executive should have exclusive interpretive authority is inconsistent with Article VI's designation of treaties as law, Article III's vesting of final judicial power in the federal courts, the Supreme Court's long-standing jurisprudence that self-executing treaties have "the force and effect of a legislative enactment," 94 and the mandatory role of the Senate in creating Article II treaty law.
To be sure, not all self-executing treaties are substantively the same. Some, though enforceable by individuals like legislation, in fact may have attributes that more closely resemble a sovereign contract. These attributes arise, for instance, when nations through a treaty undertake certain sovereign obligations owed directly to individual citizens (either the other nation's or their own) that are nonetheless enforceable by way of a private right of action or defense. Examples here include extradition and taxation treaties. 95 105. Professor Y oo has argued that historical references, which distinguish commercial from noncommercial treaties, support a presumption of non-self-execution for noncommercial treaties. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2057-58 (citing statements by the "Federal Farmer''). But as with other aspects of the debate on this matter, other scholars have pointed to compelling historical evidence to the contrary. See Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2140 (arguing that "[a]s with the thesis against self-execution generally, [Professor Y oo] offers no convincing evidence that panicky Antifederalists, or the Federalists themselves, widely adopted an understanding that commercial treaties, much less any treaty falling within Congress's Article I powers, would not function as the supreme Jaw of the land").
substantive "contractual" obligations by sovereign actors, and contemplate no discretionary sovereign conduct at all, they address themselves to the judicial, not the political, branches. Moreover, these treaties directly create a federal cause of action that private parties may pursue in federal courts.
106 Like other forms of domestic law, therefore, the application and interpretation of these legislative treaties falls within the judicial power of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution.
In short, for those treaties that create rights or obligations that are enforceable as domestic law by or against individuals, the federal courts have the same formal constitutional powers to apply the law as they do with Article I legislation. These powers may include not only interpretation of the meaning of the law, but also the supplemental authority, as delegated to them by those institutions with the constitutional power, to fill in and round out the law within the scope of a treaty.
107 As we shall see in Part II below, although the federal judiciary may not have inherent developmental powers with regard to all treaties, it may obtain those powers through a deliberate and circumscribed authorization found in specific treaties themselves.
n 'TREATY DELEGATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL POWERS
A. Statutory Delegation
The premise of the separation of powers doctrine at the core of the Constitution is that dividing governmental powers into separate, sometimes competing, institutions advances the interests of ordered liberty .
108 This does not mean, of course, that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions exist in hermetically sealed compartments in which each branch solely exercises its own, unique powers. 109 Rather, the separation of 417, 450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that the Framers of the Constitution "used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts" protected by the Bill of Rights); Loving v. United States., 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (noting that the framers believed that "freedom is imperiled if the whole of legislative, executive, and judicial power is in the same hands"); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that "the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty").
109. 112 "in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad directives."
113
The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that Congress may not delegate to nonlegislative bodies the entirety of its legislative powers on a given subject.
114 Nonetheless, as Justice Scalia has observed, the Supreme Court has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."
115 As a result, historically there have been only two instances in which the Supreme Court has found that Congress delegated excessive decision-making authority.
116
Congress is the exclusive federal lawmaking body is an oversimplification of constitutional realitynot only the reality of today, in which administrative agencies churn out reams of edicts having the force of law, but also the reality presented by the Constitution itself."); Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 869 ("Clearly, the Constitution does not establish a pure separation of powers in which each branch solely exercises all functions peculiar to it.").
110 S. 748, 758 (1996) (stating that the Court had "established long ago that Congress must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority that it could exercise itself'); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors.").
112. 488 u.s. 361 (1989 In the history of the Court we have found the requisite "inteiiigible principle" lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literaiiy no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition." Whitman, 531 U.S at 474 (citing the Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry cases).
The traditional recipients of congressional delegations of decisionmaking authority have been executive-branch agencies. This does not necessarily mean that the Constitution also permits the exercise of similar decision-making powers by the federal courts.
117 Indeed, at least since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 118 the constitutional premise of a federal government of limited, specifically enumerated powers has been understood as also prohibiting federal courts from exercising general common-law-making powers, 119 except in narrow circumstances. 120 The result of these federalism concerns is that, unlike their state counterparts, federal courts "do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision. "
121
Like administrative agencies, however, federal courts may obtain the authority to develop the law through a delegation from Congress. For nearly fifty years, the Supreme Court has recognized that within proper limits, Congress may confer on the federal courts the power to develop the law within the scope of a statute in common-law fashion. In other words, although the federal courts do not inherently have such powers, they may exercise decision-making authority when "Congress has given [them] the power to develop substantive law." 119. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (emphasizing with regard to common-law powers that "the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government"); see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 13 (explaining on the same issue that "[a]s the general structure of the Constitution and the tenth amendment make clear, the framers anticipated that the federal government would exercise only specifically enumerated powers").
120. Absent congressional authorization, federal common law is limited to those cases in which there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law." O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) ); see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (observing that "absent some congressional authorization to fonnulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases").
121. City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,312 (1981) . 122. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640; see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 40 (describing such an authority of the federal courts as "delegated lawmaking" and observing that it "takes place when Congress ... confer[ s] power on the federal courts to fashion federal rules of decision in order to round out or complete a ... statutory scheme").
Union v. Lincoln Mills.
123 Decided in the shadow of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the Court in Lincoln Mills faced an absence of congressional guidance in the Labor Management Relations Act 124 on the proper enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. After examining the Act's legislative history, the Court found that a single provision, Section 304(a), reflected an implied congressional determination to "authorize[] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law" regarding the enforcement of such agreements.125 Although some have questioned the factual foundation for this specific conclusion, 126 the decision in Lincoln Mills confirmed that Congress has the power to delegate to the federal courts the authority to develop the law within the scope of a legislative enactment. 127
Contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion in his Rejoinder to this Essay, Lincoln Mills is not an isolated anomaly. 128 Since that case, federal courts have found on a number of occasions that Congress either expressly or impliedly129 delegated authority to the federal courts to develop the law within the scope of a statute. The most prominent example of express delegation may be Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which addresses the issue of testimonial privilege. 130 In spite of the policy-laden nature of this issue, in Rule 501, unlike in other provisions in the Federal Rules, Congress simply instructed that such privileges are to be "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 131 Instead of undertaking a detailed legislative prescription, therefore, Congress expressly conferred on the federal courts the power to develop the law in this area in a common-law fashion. 132 123. 353 u.s. 448 (1957 40, 47 (1980) (noting that in the drafting of Rule 501 Congress rejected a more detailed proposal in favor of Rule 501 's general mandate to federal courts to develop the law based on common-law principles).
132. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, 8-9 (1996) (noting the instruction in Rule 501 that courts are to develop testimonial privileges based on common-law principles and stating that the rule "did not
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act provides the paradigmatic example of an implied delegation of common-law-making powers.
133 Given the broad language in Sections One and Two of that Act, 134 the Supreme Court has often found that Congress in effect delegated to the federal courts the authority to develop the law within the Act's scope "by drawing on common-law tradition."
135 Even Justice Scalia has aclmowledged that the broad "restraint of trade" term in the Sherman Act contemplates a "dynamic" development of the law by the courts, one that "invokes the common law itself. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (observing that "the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition"' (quoting Nat 'I Soc 'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688)). legal standards or adopts a legal standard that is borrowed from the common Jaw, there are "rebuttable presumptions" of delegated lawmaking). In some cases, it may be very difficult to detennine where "interpretation" in the narrow sense of detennining intended meaning ends and where the development of the Jaw in accordance with delegated authority begins. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently has recognized a sort of middle ground for some statutory schemes, in which courts must apply "federal Jaw," but apparently not a fonn the court wishes to identify as "federal common Jaw." See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998) (holding that "Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles," but stating that "[t]his is not federal common Jaw in 'the strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute, but rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a special federal rule of decision"' (quoting Atherton v. L. REv. 895 (1996) (discussing the new class of federal Jaw in which federal courts refer to state common Jaw even when fonnal federal common Jaw does not govern a particular case).
IS U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001
140. 500 u.s. 160 (1991 88 & n.197 (1989) (arguing that Congress has delegated to the federal courts "broad discretion in interpretation" under Section 1983).
145. This is particularly true of administrative agencies. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court authority to the effect that when delegating legislative powers Congress must establish an "intelligible principle" to guide the discretion of administrative agencies); see also delegation must both reflect a congressional intent to confer developmental authority and reasonably mark out the boundaries within which the courts may exercise their discretion. 146 As Professor Thomas Merrill has correctly observed, if such a delegation satisfies these criteria, "it does not violate [constitutional] principles of federalism, separation of powers, or electoral accountability. " 147
B. Treaty Delegation
While there is no constitutional infirmity in a deliberate and circumscribed congressional delegation to the federal courts of a power to develop the law within the scope of a statute, a question emerges whether similar delegation may occur through treaties. Professor Y oo suggests that the issues are separate and doubts the constitutional foundation for such a delegation of power in the treaty context. 148 The short response to this challenge is that, like delegations under Article I statutes, the source of the enhanced federal-court interpretive authority under treaties is the constitutionally empowered "treaty-lawmakers" themselves: the President and a supermajority of the Senate. In other words, the power to develop the law within the scope of a treaty arises not from an arrogation of authority by the courts, but rather from a circumscribed delegation by those with the constitutional power to create federal law through the vehicle of a treaty.
From a formal perspective, the Constitution establishes that selfexecuting treaties have the same domestic force and effect as Article I legislation.149 The inclusion of treaties within the judicial power of federal courts in Article III likewise places them on an equal footing with legislative law. To be sure, the treaty-lawmakers retain the power to direct through the substance of a treaty that it will not at all create domestic law without implementing legislation by Congress. 150 But when they choose to 146. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 41 (arguing, compellingly in my view, that Congress may delegate lawmaking authority to the courts if "the delegation is specifically intended and the area of delegation is reasonably circumscribed").
147. /d. As Professor Merrill also suggests, for reasons of electoral accountability and the absence of judicial review, it may be appropriate for Congress to give more guidance to the courts than administrative agencies. /d. at 41 n.l82 (noting also that "[i]t may also be that the test for assessing delegations to the executive branch is simply too lax"). This observation does not alter, however, the fundamental point that Congress has the power to delegate a circumscribed decision-making authority to the federal courts.
148. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85 (arguing that the delegation argument advanced in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation "suffers from [a] failure to identity any constitutional authorization for such an enormous transfer of power from the treatymakers to the courts").
149. The formal judicial authority with regard to application and interpretation of self-executing treaties likewise is fundamentally the same as it is with Article I legislation. Even at some of the earliest moments of our constitutional history, some of the Founders expressly aclmowledged that the courts were responsible for interpretation of such treaties, just as they were with statutes. For example, Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 22, "The treaties of the United States, as far as respects individuals, must like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations."
155 The Supreme Court also early on confirmed that it possessed the final responsibility for the interpretation of treaties. 156 In fulfillment of the directive in Marbury v. Madison that the judicial responsibility to apply the law includes the power to "expound and interpret" the law, 157 the Supreme Court nature of a mere contract addressed ''to the political, not the judicial department ..
• the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court''); Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, at 702 (observing that the Supreme Court's holding in Foster v. Neilson "recognize[d] that the general rule established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the courts without prior legislative action, is one that may be altered by the parties to the treaty through the treaty itself'). 151. This does not mean that the deference accorded the lawmakers under treaties and statutes in all cases must be the same. For prudential reasons, courts may properly give deference to the view of the executive in the application and interpretation of some treaties. As I explain below, however, this deference is not an unthinking, absolute one, but rather must be calibrated to the nature of the specific treaty at issue. See , 1961) . A similar observation was made by an opponent of the broad power of the judiciary over treaties. ''Brutus" criticized the inclusion of treaties as "the law of the land" because "every person who have rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts of law, in recovering them." See Saladino eds., 1986) . I cite these quotations only for purposes of background to the Supreme Court doctrine in the discussion to follow. As I have noted above, the historical background to the treaty power already has been examined exhaustively, and at best inconclusively, by Professor Yoo, and his arguments in turn have been challenged in equal detail by other scholars. See supra note 69 (citing the authority on this historical debate).
156. See, e.g has explicitly found that it has the constitutional authority to interpret treaties.158 The Court's first major treaty decision, Ware v. Hylton, 159 provides a good example. The case addressed the effect of the Supremacy Clause on state laws that were contrary to the terms of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. The fourth article of that treaty provided that private creditors "shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of ... debts." 160 Justice Chase, who offered the most detailed opinion on the effect of the Supremacy Clause, found that if an individual creditor "prosecuted his just right, it could only be in a court of justice, and if any [state laws] were set up as a lawful impediment, the courts were bound to decide, whether this article of the treaty nullified the laws .... " 161 With regard to the interpretive authority of the judiciary, Justice Chase then concluded that "the courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper authority to decide, whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the operation and effect ofit." 162
For those treaty provisions that create rights enforceable by individuals, then, the federal courts have the same formal constitutional power to apply and interpret the law as they do with Article I statutes. 163 As we have seen in the statutory context, within proper limits, 164 the constitutional institutions with the authority to create Article I federal law (the Congress either with the cooperation, or over the veto, of the President) have the power to delegate to the federal courts the authority to develop the substantive law within the scope of a statute. Just as with the formally equivalent creation of Article I federal law, the treaty-lawmakers should have the power to delegate enhanced interpretive powers to the federal judiciary. 165
158. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (holding that ''the courts have the authority to construe treaties" (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1986 (1969 In the treaty context, these constraints will require that the exercise of decision-making authority by the courts likewise proceed from an intentional and circumscribed delegation of authority by the constitutional institutions empowered to create federal law through the vehicle of a treaty (the President, with the consent of a supermajority of the Senate ).
167 Save for those questions of uniquely national interest, 168 federal courts will not have common-law developmental powers under a treaty of their own accord, 169 even on matters with international connections. But if the treaty-lawmakers both intend a delegation and reasonably frame its limits, then the exercise of such powers by the federal courts will originate only from a deliberate authorization by electorally accountable institutions. These constraints will also ensure, as in the parallel statutory context, that the exercise of delegated authority does not represent an unconstitutional arrogation by federal courts of powers allocated to the other branches of government.
Indeed, the concerns about the delegation of common-law powers to federal courts may be even less convincing in the treaty context. The principal concern that spawned the Erie limitation on the common-law powers of federal courts was one of federalism. 170 In contrast to most areas of Article I legislation, however, the power to create treaties is exclusively a federal one, for the Constitution expressly forbids states from creating law by that means.
171 And, although the issue recently has become more controversial, 172 the Supreme Court has long held that the treaty power granted to the federal government by the Constitution is plenary in scope, treaty"); Golove, supra note 13, at 1286 n.717 (asserting that "treaties are alternative modes of promulgating laws and, hence, ought presumptively to be subject to the same restrictions on delegations to which the identical laws would be subject").
166. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing the limitations on statutory delegation).
167. See id. (describing these limitations); see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 19-24 (describing the separation of powers limitations on federal common law).
168. An example is core matters of international relations, such as the Act of State Doctrine. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423-27 (1964) (holding that federal common law in this area is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests").
169. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1321 REv. , 1412 REv. -19 (2001 (observing that the limitations on federal common law reflect the idea that "the Constitution constrains ... the manner in which the federal government may exercise [its delegated] powers to displace state law"); Merrill, supra note 109, at 13-19 (describing the federalism limitations on federal common law).
170. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 13 (observing that federalism ''was the key principle invoked in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'').
171. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10 (providing that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation").
172. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the controversy over whether there are any substantive limits on the scope of the treaty power). subject only to the more specific constitutional protections such as those found in the Bill of Rights.
173 But within these (admittedly important) constraints, a delegation of authority to develop the law under a treaty does not violate the federalism principles that limit the common-law powers of federal courts.
The only Supreme Court opinion that has directly addressed this issue fully comports with this reasoning. In Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, Co., 174 an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court addressed how it should fill a particular regulatory gap in the Warsaw Convention on air transportation. 175 It ultimately decided that resolution of this issue required the Court to apply otherwise-applicable domestic law.
176 But it only did so after finding as a factual matter that the treaty did not "empower [the Court] to develop some common-law rule-under cover of general admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal federal disposition."
177 That is, the Court did not question that the treatylawmakers have the authority to empower federal courts to develop the law under a treaty; it merely held that they factually had not done so in that case.
178
In contrast to the treaty at issue in Zicherman, the private-law conventions I analyzed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation expressly empower the courts to develop federal common law.
179 Specifically, I examined the interpretive principles expressly prescribed in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,' 80 a 173. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the federal government could exercise by treaty even powers that are denied Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution); see also Golove, supra note 13, at 1257-66 (describing Missouri v. Holland in more detail and defending its conclusion); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 16-18 (1957) (holding that a treaty may not contravene specific provisions of the Constitution).
174. 516 u.s. 217 (1996) 914, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1999 ) (citing Zicherman as support for a decision to "refrain from fashioning a federal common law meaning to the term willful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d I, 9 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to fill a gap in the Warsaw Convention because it "does not authorize federal common law").
178. Zicherman, 516 U.S. at229. 179. Even at the time of the submittal of this treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, it was the clear understanding of the executive branch that the courts would apply the U. .. is self-executing and thus requires no federal implementing legislation to come into force throughout the United States"); id. at 1371 (referring to the application of the Convention "by American courts").
180. See CISG, supra note 7. The official, English-language version is also reprinted at 52 FED. REG. 6264 (1987) .
self-executing treaty ratified by the United States in 1986. 181 As I explained there, Article 7(2) of that treaty, which has since become the paradigm for other, yet unratified treaties, 182 expressly authorizes the courts to fill gaps that arise in its regulatory scheme.
183 Specifically, Article 7(2) provides that "[ q]uestions ... not expressly settled" in the Convention "are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based."
184
Neither the treaty itself nor its drafting history identifies these "general principles," however. 185 Thus, the delegation of the power to fill gaps in the treaty as they emerge over time necessarily contemplates an active role by the courts in the development of the law. 183. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 733-34. 184. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2). See also Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 182, art. 6(2); Convention on Factoring, supra note 182, art. 4(2); Convention on Agency, supra note 182, art. 6(2); Convention on Security Interests, supra note 182, art. 6(2).
185. I will not reexamine in detail here the specific means by which the general-principles methodology functions both to fill gaps (both "open" and "hidden") in a treaty and to otherwise permit a dynamic interpretation of the law within the scope of the U.N. Sales Convention. This more detailed analysis can be found in Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 761-91. Article 7(2) permits a court to resort to domestic law only if an active search for the relevant general principles under the treaty yields no results. But see id. at 791 (arguing that because of a separate instruction to interpreters to advance interests of international uniformity, courts should only rarely resort to this provision and apply domestic law).
186. Separately, the general-principles methodology also addresses the debate over the propriety of strict textualist approaches to matters of interpretation. As I explained in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, a requirement that interpreters probe undefmed general principles in matters of interpretation contemplates enhanced consideration of the drafting history of the Convention. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 743-53. Moreover, as was the case with the U.N. Sales Convention, the institutional process for the drafting of most multilateral private-law conventions involves the creation of detailed records of the drafting process, records that are available long before Senate consideration of the treaty. Indeed, the President emphasized the availability of drafting records in recommending the Senate's consent to the U.N. Sales Convention. See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz to As I argued in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, by consenting to and ratifying this general-principles methodology, the Senate and President act through their joint power as constitutional treaty-lawmakers to give "the courts the power to develop substantive law." 187 This delegation through the vehicle of a treaty thus parallels the express statutory delegation of authority in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the implied delegations sanctioned by the Supreme Court for the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and other legislative enactments.
188 Moreover, the Convention carefully marks out the boundaries within which courts may exercise their discretion. This specific delegation of developmental powers to the federal courts satisfies federalism and separation of powers concerns that limit federal common law by defining its sphere of application 189 and expressly instructing that the delegated authority to fill regulatory gaps only extends to those matters within that scope. 190 In addition, the exercise of this delegated authority may only proceed on the basis of the "general principles" reflected in the substance of the treaty adopted by the treaty-lawmakers themselves.
As in the statutory context, a delegation of decision-making authority under a treaty also may occur in an implied fashion. The U.N. Sales Convention, for example, also contains (beyond its express delegation) a number of broad, indefinite terms, 191 which by their very nature involve the exercise of judicial discretion as they are applied and given functional content over time. 192 Moreover, an implied authorization to develop federal Ronald Reagan, Aug. 30, 1983 , reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1368 , 1369 (1983 ST. LJ. 265, 299 (1984) (concluding that CISG "[a ]rticle 7 seems to express the wish that the broad terms of the Convention be filled in over time by a world common law, a shared body of interpretation that would supply a gloss on the text," but lamenting a supposed absence of sufficient express guidance for the process).
188. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text. 189. See CISG, supra note 7, art. I (stating that the Convention applies to sale-of-goods transactions that satisfY certain internationality requirements); see also id. art. 2 (excluding certain classes of transactions that otherwise would fall within the scope of the Convention).
190. See id. art. 7(2) (providing that the authority to fill gaps only extends to matters "governed by the Convention"). Even for matters within the scope of the Convention, examination of text, context, and drafting histozy may reveal an affirmative decision by the treatymakers to reject a particular normative solution for an ostensibly unresolved issue. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 16, 191. An illustration of this point under the U.N. Sales Convention is the concept of "reasonableness." In over thirty separate provisions, the Convention defines rights or obligations with reference to what is "reasonable" or "unreasonable," but it nowhere defines those terms. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 751-52. 192 . See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing the implied delegation of decision-making authority that arises when Congress legislates in the form of broad standards).
common law may flow from a direction to the courts to ensure uniformity in the application of a treaty. 193 While general interests of federal uniformity alone may be insufficient, 194 an instruction from the constitutionallawmakers to the same effect (such as the one set forth in a separate provision of tlie U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny)l 95 should be viewed as an explicit authorization to develop federal common law to ensure national uniformity for interpretive matters within the scope of a treaty.196
As Dynamic Treaty Interpretation argued, such an instruction to promote uniformity also implies that federal courts must consider interpretive court opinions in other member states. 197 This does not create separate constitutional concerns, however. 198 A decision to afford mandatory precedential effect to foreign court opinions may present an issue worthy of more detailed analysis. But a simple instruction that courts in this country should give appropriate deference to other member-state court opinions in the interests of uniformity merely makes express what the Supreme Court already has found to be a prudential consideration in matters of treaty interpretation.199 193. Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (observing that those federal programs that "'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules" (quoting United States v. Yazell, 383 U.S. 341, 354 (1966) S. 487 (1941). 195. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 7 (1) (providing that interpreters of the convention must have regard for "the need to promote uniformity in its application"); Convention on Factoring, supra note 182, art. 4(1) (same); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 182, art. 8(1) (same); Draft Convention on Security Interests, supra note 182, art. 6(1) (same).
196. Justice Scalia's opinion in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. once again provides a good contrast There, the Supreme Court refused to fill a gap in the Warsaw Convention in the form of a rule of federal common law, but only after it first concluded as a factual matter that the treaty did not "authorizeD national courts to pursue uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law." Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 231. Even in matters (such as commercial law) traditionally reserved to the states, such an express direction to pursue international uniformity also overcomes the reluctance of the Supreme Court to find a federal preemption of state law. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 Supp. 2d , 1147 Supp. 2d -52 (2001 (holding that the uniformity directive in the U.N. Sales Convention evidences an intent by the treaty-lawmakers to preempt state law causes of action for matters within its scope); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) 404 (1985) (stating with regard to treaty interpretation that "the opinions of our sister signatories are to be entitled to A deliberate and circumscribed delegation to federal courts of an authority to develop the law within the scope of a self-executing treaty is fully consistent with the structure of the Constitution. Such a delegation indeed involves a transfer to the courts of certain powers that the President and Senate could exercise directly. 200 Parallel to statutory delegation, however, the exercise of these common-law powers does not reflect a unilateral encroachment by the federal courts on powers allocated to other branches, but rather it flows from an intentional and limited transfer by the constitutional treaty-lawmakers themselves. And in this context as well, there are sound reasons for the Supreme Court to conclude, as it has with statutory delegations, that it should not "second-guess" these constitutional lawmakers "regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those ... applying the law."
201 Indeed, this observation is consistent with the Court's long-standing jurisprudence, which is equally applicable in the treaty context, that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it."
202
The preeminent role of the executive in foreign policy matters properly will influence judicial decision-making in the development of the law under some treaties in some circumstances. This prudential consideration does not, however, undermine the formal constitutional foundation for a circumscribed delegation of power under a treaty. Rather, as we shall examine in more detail in Part III, it merely relates to the degree to which the courts should show deference to the views of the executive branch in the situational exercise of that power.
III THE TREATY POWER AND DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE
The difficulty with much of the commentary on the role of treaties in our constitutional system is the tendency to view all of them as fundamentally the same. As a result, compelling analyses on narrow subjects often dissolve in their express or implied extrapolation. One prominent example of this phenomenon is the common assertion that foreign-policy concerns require that courts defer to the executive branch in all matters of treaty considerable weight" (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (1978) , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979))); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 93, § 325, cmt. d ("Treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through their internal courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity of result despite differences between national legal systems.").
200. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85 (questioning the constitutionality of treaty delegations of federal common-law authority because it would involve an "enormous transfer" of power from the treatymakers to the courts).
201. interpretation.2°3 This is an important point for the analysis here; for, if the executive foreign-affairs powers in Article II somehow radiate to Article III and neutralize the judicial power to interpret the law under treaties, there may be little functional value to a formal delegation of developmental authority to the courts. As we shall see, however, the executive's role in foreign affairs varies in importance according to the type of treaty involved. Furthermore, the Constitution itself suggests that the executive's control in this area is not absolute.
A. The Executive's Role in Foreign Policy
It is certainly correct that the President has primary responsibility over the international conduct of the United States as a sovereign entity. As Professor Y oo correctly observes, both the text and the drafting history of Article II contemplate that the executive branch would be the primary institution in carrying out the nation's foreign affairs.2 04 And, of course, the initiation of treaties is within the power of the President, subject to Senate consent. Moreover, the exigencies of national defense, the delicacy of international diplomacy, and the need in many circumstances for a unitary voice in foreign relations create strong functionalist arguments for affording substantial discretion to the President on such issues. 205 The President's authority in matters of foreign policy is not absolute, however. The Senate also plays an integral role in shaping foreign policy, through its advice and consent to the ratification of treaties. 206 Moreover, the Constitution expressly grants to Congress the powers to declare war, 207 to regulate foreign commerce, 208 and to define offenses against internationallaw,209 as well as the ultimate authority, under its spending power/ 10 to withhold funding for foreign activities with which it disagrees. In addition, Congress as a whole also may exercise general authority in this area through traditional Article I legislation, if necessary, by overriding a Presidential veto. Nor are powers expressly allocated to other constitutional institutions somehow transferred to the executive merely because they may affect foreign affairs. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has long confirmed that the determination of individual rights under treaties is fundamentally a judicial responsibility.
211 More broadly, the Court has made clear that a matter's potential foreign-policy implications do not by themselves transform it into a political question. As it emphatically stated in its famous opinion on the subject in Baker v. Carr, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."
212
On the specific issue of treaty interpretation, even the Rehnquist court has refused to accept assertions that executive interpretations bind the courts. 213 In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 214 a highly politicized case in which the Court ultimately agreed with the President's interpretation, for example, the Court observed that if a treaty is self-executing, then "it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other."
215
In applying this conclusion, federal courts on a number of occasions have refused to accept the interpretation of a treaty asserted by executive-branch officials. 216 210. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing that "[n] o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law").
211. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,239 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (concluding with regard to the interpretation of a treaty provision that the courts ''were the only proper authority to decide, whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the operation and effect of it"); see also supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text analyzing Supreme Court authority on the role of the judiciary in the treaty interpretation).
212. 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962) ; see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,230 (1986) .
!d.
We are cognizant of the interplay between [certain statutory provisions] and the conduct of this Nation's foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.
213. See Bederman, supra note 16, at 1016 (concluding after an extensive analysis of the Court's treaty jurisprudence that "the Rehnquist Court has refused to accept the government's position that its interpretations of treaties are privileged and beyond judicial review").
214. 504 u.s. 655 (1992 222 Only in the most attenuated or contorted definition of the term, or in the most extreme circumstances, will an interpretation of this latter class of treaties influence United States foreign policy at all.
B. Calibrated Deference
The variety of treaties and different degrees of executive involvement suggest that the proper approach to executive interpretations of treaties is one of calibrated deference. For diplomatic and national defense treaties, the deference due executive agencies properly may be substantial. In this context, as Professor Y oo convincingly argues, the executive branch may have significant structural advantages in both understanding the context of a treaty and giving practical meaning to its provisions. 223 Indeed, as the institution in actual control of the day-to-day operation of those treaties, some level of executive interpretation simply is unavoidable. 224 For such treaties, entrusting a specific executive-branch agency with the responsibility for the continuing administration of their provisions may reflect an implicit delegation of enhanced interpretive discretion. 225 Professor Curtis Bradley has suggested in this regard that the issue of deference to executive treaty interpretations might be resolved by analogy to the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine. 226 Under this doctrine, an express congressional delegation to an executive agency of administrative authority over a statute also carries an implied delegation of enhanced interpretative powers.
227 As a result, courts must defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is not contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and is a "permissible" construction of the statute.
228 Professor Bradley suggests that the executive's preeminence in the matters of foreign affairs permits an implied delegation approach that parallels the Chevron doctrine. 229 He thus argues that an analogy to the Chevron doctrine may both explain and frame the degree of deference due reasonable interpretations of treaties by those executive agencies charged with their administration and enforcement.
230
Even such an analogy to the Chevron doctrine carries an important internal limitation, however. In the statutory context, the Supreme Court in Chevron and its progeny has made clear that a deliberate congressional delegation of continuing administrative authority over a statutory field is a precondition to the enhanced judicial deference to agency interpretations of the statute.
231 Even if one properly can extend the doctrine to the treaty context, therefore, an essential predicate for enhanced deference to executive interpretations is an entrustment of continuing administrative authority to a specific agency. A careful reading of Supreme Court rhetoric on treaty interpretation in fact reveals precisely such a requirement: when the Court has referred to deference to the executive branch it has consistently stated as a precondition that the interpretive views must be expressed "by the government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement."
in the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments ... to invest the president with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations Even in the treaty context, this precondition for deference to executive agencies provides a significant limitation. Many treaties, in particular those that create individual rights, may provide only rare opportunities for administration by executive agencies. 233 For those private-law treaties that only create rights enforceable by and against private entities/ 34 most often there will be no foundation for implied delegation of interpretive authority to the executive at all. Similarly, as the degree to which a treaty implicates foreign affairs concerns decreases, so too should the degree of deference to executive views about the meaning of its provisions. As with the commercial law conventions discussed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, where a treaty involves no sovereign obligations and carries only the most attenuated foreign-policy implications, the propriety of deference should dissolve almost entirely. 235 In short, without an entrustment of continuing administrative authority to an executive-branch agency, what remains is a slidingscale deference calibrated to the overall persuasiveness of a proffered executive-branch interpretation of a treaty and to any implications for our nation's foreign affairs.
236
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the propriety of deference in El AI Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng 237 is consistent with this reasoning. The case involved the interpretation of the private-law Warsaw Convention on air transportation. On the issue of deference, the Court once again cited the above authority that the views of those executive agencies that are charged with the enforcement of a treaty are entitled to great weight. 238 But it also characterized the general proposition of deference to executive interpretations in noticeably more careful, measured without express limitation that courts should afford "great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 93, § 326(2).
233. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 706-07 (arguing that "Chevron deference concerning the meaning of a treaty" would not be absolute, but rather "be limited to situations where the executive branch entity has been charged with applying the treaty").
234. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 698-99 (describing the variety of private-law treaties that create only individual rights and obligations).
235. Interestingly, the most prominent recent case in which the Supreme Court has not deferred to the executive dealt with interpretation of a treaty provision that governed solely the rights between private entities. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (interpreting the express provisions of the Warsaw Convention on air transportation); see also Bederman, supra note 16, at 1018 (noting that the Supreme Court interpreted the Warsaw Convention contrary to the view of the solicitor general, although the majority opinion in Chan does not mention this fact).
236. This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's recent opinions on the propriety of deference to executive-branch interpretations of statutes where the Chevron doctrine does not apply. See Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833, 856-63 (2001) (arguing that recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that even when Chervon does not apply, federal courts should give deference to executive agency interpretations of statutes based on their overall persuasiveness) (citing and analyzing in this regard Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) tones. The Court described the proper principle merely as one of "respect" for the executive, and it stated that this respect is only "ordinarily" due to the "reasonable" views of the executive branch concerning the meaning of a treaty.
239
Assertions that treaty law is fundamentally executive in nature (even if accepted) do not undermine this conclusion. In the parallel constitutional situation of Article I legislation, Congress is the preeminent decisionmaking institution. Nonetheless, as we have seen/ 40 the Supreme Court has made clear that a subsequent Congress does not have the authority to interpret earlier legislation without adhering to the full constitutional process for the creation of binding legal norms (that is, without passing a law signed by, or over the veto of, the President).Z 41 In the same way, the opinions of later executive-branch officials as to the meaning of an earlier selfexecuting treaty are constitutionally suspect, for they also do not undergo the process prescribed in Article II for the creation of treaty law.
242
Finally, arguments founded on presumed executive expertise likewise do not justify anything more than calibrated deference. On delicate matters of international diplomacy and national defense, the structural advantages and resultant expertise of the executive may support substantial deference on treaty interpretation matters. For other treaties, however, there may be no reason to assume any special executive-branch expertise. The commercial law treaties analyzed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation once again provide good examples. The subjects of these conventions are detailed matters of commercial law, such as the international sale of goods, receivables financing, and security interests in moveable equipment.
243
Experts in the respective fields draft such private-law treaties under the auspices of permanent international institutions, some of which are nongovernmental. 244 Indeed, this drafting process substantially parallels the 247 Functional arguments founded on executive preeminence m foreign affairs thus do not mandate absolute judicial acquiescence to executive-branch interpretations of all treaties. Respect for the executive's important role in the conduct of foreign affairs will justify calibrated judicial deference to the reasonable interpretation of treaties with foreignaffairs implications. It may also be appropriate to grant enhanced deference to executive interpretations where the treaty-lawmakers have entrusted the continuing administration of a treaty to a particular executive agency. But this respect for the reasonable views of the executive does not displace the core judicial responsibility to interpret treaties that create domestically enforceable rights, nor does it invalidate a properly circumscribed delegation of authority to the courts to develop the law within their scope.
CONCLUSION
The subject of the interpretation of treaties is sure to become an increasingly contentious one. Just as the growth of statutes into this nation's "primary source of law" 248 propelled statutory interpretation into one of the most animated themes of legal scholarship, so too does the rise of treaty law promise to spawn increasingly heated academic debate. One aspect of the treaty power that thus far has largely escaped scholarly and judicial attention is the authority of the treaty-lawmakers (the President, with the consent of the Senate) to delegate developmental powers to the federal courts. In this light, Professor Y oo' s call for more intense scrutiny of the constitutional foundation for such an authority is to be welcomed. I have argued here that, parallel to an established principle in the statutory context, a deliberate and circumscribed delegation of authority to develop the law within the scope of a self-executing treaty fully comports with both the text and structure of the Constitution. Indeed, a whole range of private-law treaties, some ratified, others waiting to be, already expressly contain such a delegation. As this and other issues of treaty law continue to gain prominence in our domestic legal system, this debate sounds a call to judges and scholars for substantially more analysis of the proper role of the judiciary in the interpretation of treaties as one part of "the supreme Law of the Land." 
